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S
ince the end of World War II the U.S. share of
world income has fallen, while U.S. trade with
the rest of the world has increased. Many believe
that these two trends are not coincidental. U.S.
firms that once dominated automobile, steel, and
consumer electronics industries face stiff competi-
tion from Japan and increasing competition from
South Korea and other industrializing countries.
In response to the changing pattern of world
trade, the automobile, steel, semiconductor, and
other industries have requested and received
increased trade protection in the form of voluntary
export restraints, countervailing duties, and anti-
dumping lawsuits. The trend toward trade liberaliza-
tion, beginning with the Generalized Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947, appears to be
changing as the United States and other countries
escalate their use of protection to limit imports—
especially imports from developing countries.
The perception that liberalized trade con-
tributes to unemployment has been a primary
cause of the rise in protection. Indeed, much of
the debate surrounding the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has focused on the
question of whether free trade with Mexico will
take jobs away from the United States.
Does free trade cause unemployment, or
does it enhance economic growth? In this article,
we examine the case for free trade in theory and
in the light of recent experience. Fortunately, there
is now a good deal of data on trade and protec-
tion from numerous countries to use in assessing
the role of trade in economic performance. Despite
some theoretical exceptions to arguments for free




The most fundamental argument for interna-
tional trade is that it enables a country to expand
the quantity of goods and services it consumes.
Through imports, a country can acquire goods
and services that it either cannot produce at home
or can produce at home only at a cost that is
greater than the cost of obtaining them indirectly
by exchanging them for the exports it produces.
In other words, through trade, a country can obtain
goods and services with greater efficiency by
specializing in those activities in which the country
has a comparative advantage. For example, the
United States can spend its unique talents in
developing computing and communications tech-
nology while Japan devotes its efforts to consumer
electronics. If Japan did not perform these tasks,
the United States would have to shift resources
from other activities into the production of cam-
corders, flat-panel displays, TV sets, and other
items that the United States currently imports.
David Ricardo developed the principle of
comparative advantage in 1817. It says that every
country, no matter how inefficient in its overall
production structure, can always profitably export
The Theory and Practice of Free Trade
Gerald P. O’Driscoll, Jr. offered extremely helpful com-
ments as the reviewer for this article. We also benefited from
the discussions and comments of William C. Gruben. All
remaining errors are solely our responsibility.Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 2
some goods to pay for its most desired imports.
A country’s wages reflect its general productivity
level and its overall standard of living, but they
do not determine its competitiveness or which
goods it ultimately exports. Countries with high
overall productivity will have high wages, and
countries with low overall productivity will have
low wages.
What matters for trade is that within coun-
tries different industries are more productive than
others. It is unavoidable that each country has
industries with both higher than average and
lower than average productivities. Because a
country’s high-productivity industries need only
pay that country’s competitive market wage, these
industries will have lower relative costs and will be
able to compete in world markets. This principle
is the basis for trade. For example, the United
States has higher wages than Mexico, but this
difference does not prevent the United States from
selling products to Mexico. On the contrary, U.S.
industries with higher than average productivities,
such as the computer industry, can export sub-
stantial amounts to Mexico at a lower cost than
Mexico can produce them. Likewise, Mexico will
export goods and services from its industries with
higher than average productivities because these
industries will have a cost advantage in the United
States. (See the box entitled, “A Simple Example
of Comparative Advantage.”)
Although we usually think of the benefits of
international trade as limited to the exchange of
goods and services, perhaps the greatest benefit
of international commerce results from the trans-
mission of ideas. Throughout history, international
trade has served as the principal means by which
new goods (such as the potato), services (such as
the music of the Beatles), and processes (such as
Japanese just-in-time manufacturing) have spread
around the globe. Even rediscoveries of lost civili-
zations have led to new ideas about furniture,
decoration, and art. Our alphabet was devised to
keep international trading records on Phoenician
ships without using highly trained scribes.
The concept of comparative advantage
between countries is analogous to exchange
between individuals. Suppose a lawyer can
write five briefs or type two pages of text in an
hour, while a secretary can write one brief or
type two pages of text in an hour. Is there
room for trade between the lawyer and the
secretary?
Although the lawyer can write more briefs
and type just as fast as the secretary, it is
worthwhile for the lawyer to specialize in
writing briefs and the secretary to do the
typing. Trade between the secretary and law-
yer leads to higher output.
Suppose that the lawyer and the secre-
tary do not trade and each spends half of an
eight-hour day typing and writing briefs. The
lawyer would write twenty (20 = 4 × 5) briefs
and type eight pages (8 = 4 × 2), while the
A Simple Example of Comparative Advantage
secretary would write four briefs (4 = 4 × 1)
and type eight pages (8 = 4 × 2). Combined
output for the lawyer and the secretary would
be twenty-four briefs and sixteen typed pages.
However, if the lawyer and secretary
traded services, and the lawyer specialized
in writing briefs and the secretary specialized
in typing, their combined output would be forty
briefs (40 = 8 × 5) and sixteen typed pages
(16 = 8 × 2), which is clearly an increase in
overall production. The lawyer has a com-
parative advantage in writing briefs, and the
secretary has a comparative advantage in
typing. The same basic principle applies to
exchange between countries. Countries gain
from trade because they obtain goods and
services more cheaply by specializing in ac-
tivities in which they have a comparative
advantage.Economic Review — Fourth Quarter 1993 3
The effects of protection
Perhaps one of the best natural tests of
whether free trade works can be found in the
experience of developing countries. In the 1950s
and 1960s, many developing countries adopted
the import substitution industrialization policy
expounded by Raúl Prebisch. The idea, also
known as the dependency theory, was that if poor
countries wanted to develop, they would have to
start producing manufactured goods rather than
continue to rely on imports of these goods from
developed countries in exchange for exports of
primary products. The fear was that as income
rose, the demand for manufactured products
would increase relative to primary products, and
this change would lead to a lower relative price
for primary products in international markets. In
other words, if the poor countries were ever to
become rich, they would have to substitute their
own domestically produced manufactured goods
for manufactured imports. This policy was imple-
mented by imposing high trade barriers on
imports from developed countries.
After thirty years, however, the evidence
clearly points to the failure of highly protected
import substitution trade regimes and the success
of outward-oriented open trade regimes. Figure 1
plots the growth experience of developing coun-
tries against their level of protection as measured
by the country’s real exchange rate distortion.
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Growth Per Capita and Level of Protection, 1976–85
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measure of the degree of protection.1 As the figure
shows, countries that have pursued highly protec-
tionist policies, such as Tanzania, Nigeria, and
Ghana, grew much more slowly than the relatively
open economies of Southeast Asia, such as Hong
Kong, South Korea, and Singapore.2
The basic problem with the import substitu-
tion strategy is that it assumes development can
only occur through manufacturing and that it is
only possible to develop manufacturing by pro-
tecting it. To be successful, however, countries
have not had to rely solely on manufactured goods
production. Regardless of the economic sector—
manufacturing, agriculture, or mining—countries
have done best by exploiting their natural compara-
tive advantage. In fact, after moving toward a
more liberalized trading environment, most
countries increase productivity and growth in
agriculture as well as manufacturing.
In twenty-nine episodes of trade liberaliza-
tion analyzed by Michaely, Papageorgiou, and
Choksi (1991), growth increased in both the manu-
facturing and agriculture sectors after liberalization
(Table 1). Moreover, growth in most agricultural
sectors increased not only after the liberalization
period but also during the process of liberaliza-
tion. In other words, for many countries, the
benefits of liberalization have been widespread
and immediate. Evidently, market economies are
sufficiently flexible in most countries to allow the
liberalized sectors to expand more quickly than
the once-protected sectors contract.
Another flaw in the import substitution
theory is the implicit assumption that international
competition does not matter to a thriving and
strong manufacturing sector. In countries with an
inward-looking import substitution policy, firms
have no incentive to innovate. The lack of compe-
tition leads to high-priced, poor-quality products
and retards economic growth. For example, in
1870 Argentina had a larger per capita income
level than Japan or Germany. But after more than
one hundred years of intense government inter-
vention and high protection, Argentina was at the
lower end of the world distribution of income.
Until the late 1980s, a 1968 Ford Falcon was one
of the finest, most luxurious cars available in
Buenos Aires.
The lesson is that outward-oriented policies
are a much stronger conduit for economic growth
and advancement than protectionist import sub-
stitution policies. In highly protected regimes,
resources are attracted to industries that do not
reflect the comparative advantage of the country.
Moreover, protected industries, because they lack
the incentive to innovate, produce high-cost,
inferior products.
Common misperceptions
Public understanding of international trade
issues is often hampered by an array of misper-
ceptions. In this section, we evaluate the logical
and empirical underpinnings of several common
arguments.
Exports are good, imports are bad. In discus-
sions of a country’s trade balance we often hear
terms that are filled with value judgements. For
example, a worsening trade balance implies that
imports are growing faster than exports, while an
improving trade balance implies that exports are
growing faster than imports. However, by itself, a
trade surplus or deficit is not inherently bad or
good. Over time, a U.S. trade deficit must be
followed by a U.S. trade surplus. If this were not
true, then it would imply that other countries are
willingly providing goods to the United States
without the expectation of repayment.
1 As measured by Dollar (1992). The real exchange rate
distortion is a measure of the degree to which a country’s
tradable goods prices are distorted by domestic trade
policies. The greater the amount of domestic protection is,
the larger the real exchange rate distortion. Other measures
of protection, such as the effective rate of protection and its
black market exchange rate premium, also show a strong
negative correlation with economic growth. See Gould and
Ruffin (1993) for a detailed empirical examination of the
relationship between growth and trade regime.
2 Although Southeast Asian economies are relatively open to
trade, this does not imply a lack of government intervention.
Government protection of import-competing industries in
these economies is often undone by government support of
export industries. In other words, resources that would be
attracted away from export sectors to the import-competing
sectors because of protection are kept in the export sectors
because of export subsidies. Consequently, the resource
misallocation and the price distortion between exports and
imports is relatively low.Economic Review — Fourth Quarter 1993 5
When looking at trade balances this way it
is easy to see that the cost of imports are exports.
When a country exports something, it gives up
the products of its resources; when a country
imports something, it adds to the quantity of goods
it can consume. What a country can consume at
home equals what it produces plus its imports
minus its exports. Thus, from the standpoint what
a country can consume, imports are good. The
proper concept is what economists call the terms
of trade, the quantity of imports a country receives
in exchange for a given quantity of its exports.
The larger the terms of trade, the better. This
basic truth was discovered many years ago by
David Hume, Adam Smith, and David Ricardo as
they developed a rationale to counter the doctrine
of mercantilism.
Mercantilists were a group of business
writers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
who argued that a nation was like a business.
This analogy, however, suffers from the fallacy of
composition: what is true for a part need not be
true of the whole. The mercantalists mistakenly
argued that it was better to sell more to foreigners
than to buy from them. In this way, it was claimed,
a country with a “favorable trade balance” would
benefit the most from international trade. This
language is still with us today, reminding us of a
quotation from John Maynard Keynes (1936, 383):
[T]he ideas of economists..., both when they
are right and when they are wrong, are more
powerful than is commonly understood.
Indeed the world is ruled by little else. Prac-
tical men, who believe themselves to be
quite exempt from any intellectual influ-
ences, are usually the slaves of some defunct
economist.
We often are guilty of a good deal of Orwel-
lian doublethink when it comes to exports and
imports. When trading with a friendly nation, like
Japan, it is considered bad to export less to them
than we import. But when we consider trade with
an enemy, such as the former Soviet Union at the
height of the Cold War or Saddam Hussein’s Iraq,
it is considered treason export anything at all to
them. For some reason, in times of war or tension,
we can see through the flows of money and focus
on the flows of goods. Just think of imports of
food into starving Somalia. Are the Somalians
worse off? Obviously not. A trade “deficit” is per-
haps best thought of as a surplus: the value of
goods coming into a country exceeds the value
of goods leaving the country.
Trade and economic powerhouses. Another
reason some observers consider trade deficits bad
stems from the notion that a country with a huge
trade surplus is an economic powerhouse. Some
Table 1
Summary of Manufacturing and Agricultural Performance
Before, During, and After Liberalization
(Real Annual Percentage Rate of Growth)
PtL T T + 1 T + 2 T + 3
Manufacturing 6.7 5.3 6.9 6.9 8.0
Agriculture 2.8 2.9 5.5 2.8 3.9
PtL, average of three years up to liberalization
T Year of liberalization
T + 1 One year after liberalization
T + 2 Two years after liberalization
T + 3 Three years after liberalization
SOURCE: Michaely, Papageorgiou, and Choksi (1991).Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 6
people consider the country with the biggest
surplus to be the most competitive and efficient
nation on earth. Japan is one such candidate. This
concept is flawed because trade deficits or surpluses
today are the consequence of a country’s current
and historical position in the international flow
of capital. International lending and borrowing
allow countries to buy now and pay later, just as
domestic lending and borrowing allow individuals
to buy now and pay later. What must be true is
that the imports of goods and services now must
be paid for by the exports of goods and services
later. There is no free lunch.
For example, in 1992 the United States had a
merchandise trade deficit of $96 billion and net
unilateral (mostly government) transfers to foreigners
of $31 billion. To finance this outflow of $127
billion, the United States received about $10 billion
in net investment income from foreigners, had a
$55 billion surplus in service transactions (travel,
license fees, insurance, and so forth), and borrowed
approximately $62 billion. The reason the United
States has a trade deficit is because it earns large
amounts from direct investments abroad, has a
comparative advantage in selling services, and is
considered by many foreigners to be a good place
to invest capital. The United States does not have
a trade deficit because it cannot compete in world
markets. (See the box entitled, “International
Capital Movements and the Balance of Trade.”)
Most recent discussion of the U.S. merchan-
dise trade deficit has focused on the United States’
billion-dollar bilateral trade deficit with Japan. To
a large degree, Japan has a trade surplus because
Japanese savings are relatively large compared with
investment opportunities in Japan. In the same
manner, the United States has a trade deficit because
its savings are relatively low compared with invest-
ment opportunities in the United States. Strong pros-
pects for growth and investment opportunities in
the United States can increase the U.S. trade deficit,
but this deficit is not impoverishing. Without inter-
national capital flows, U.S. rates of interest would
be much higher than they actually are. Indeed,
Americans who borrowed to build U.S. factories
and homeowners who refinanced their homes in
1992 and 1993 at low rates of interest were bene-
ficiaries of these international capital flows.
The level playing field. We often say we believe
in free trade, but we want trade to be “fair” because
International Capital Movements and the Balance of Trade
The balance of trade reflects how long a
country has been a borrower or lender. To
understand this concept, let us examine the
basic structure of a country’s balance of pay-
ments. Let X = Exports, M = Imports, T = net
gifts or unilateral transfers to foreigners, ∆B =
net new borrowing from abroad, B = net
indebtedness to the rest of the world, and r =
the rate of interest on foreign indebtedness. A
country’s balance of payments must be
X + ∆B = T + M + rB.
The left-hand side of the equation refers
to receipts from foreigners; the right-hand
side refers to payments to foreigners. These
must always balance. If ∆B > 0, a country is
borrowing; if B > 0, a country is a net debtor.
If ∆B < 0, a country is lending, and if B < 0, a
country is a net creditor. A country is consid-
ered to be a relatively young, or immature,
borrowing nation when its net indebtedness,
B, is small compared with its net new borrow-
ing, ∆B. In this case, imports will be greater
then exports (M > X ). A country is con-
sidered to be a relatively mature borrowing
nation when the interest it pays on foreign
indebtedness, rB, is larger than its net new
borrowing from abroad, ∆B. Here, exports are
greater than imports (X > M). The opposite is
true for an immature or mature creditor coun-
try. As a consequence, trade surpluses or
deficits are simple reflections of the efficient
means of allocating the world’s capital.Economic Review — Fourth Quarter 1993 7
foreigners protect or subsidize some of their pro-
ducers. This argument is convincing at the political
level because it appeals to the sentiment in all of
us to deal with others as they deal with us, but it is
a red herring. One flaw is its reliance on the mis-
perception that we benefit from exports and lose
from imports. However, the core idea is the claim
that the benefits of free trade only accrue if free
trade is followed in other countries.
A country can still gain from free trade even
if free trade is not followed elsewhere. Although
protection in other countries can reduce a country’s
benefit from trade, a country will continue to gain
from trade because it can obtain certain goods on
cheaper terms by importing them rather than
producing them at home. It makes little difference
to the free trade country why it is getting the
goods on cheaper terms. If it is because another
country is subsidizing those exports, the free trade
country is simply being provided a gift. As Table 2
suggests, in practice, the countries of the world
that grow the fastest are precisely those that have
the most open markets, despite high protection
elsewhere in the world.
Foreign wages are too low. Perhaps the most
subtle argument against free trade is that it is
unfair to compete with countries paying wages
that are far below domestic standards. To a textile
Table 2
Protection and Per Capita GDP Growth, 1960–85
Countries with Effective Rates Countries with Effective Rates
of Protection Less than 40 Percent of Protection Greater than 40 Percent
Country Average Annual Growth Country Average Annual Growth
(1960–85) (1960–85)
Bangladesh .6 Algeria 2.6
Burma 2.6 Angola –1.7
Canada 2.4 Bolivia 1.3
Colombia 2.0 Burundi .6
Costa Rica 1.8 Cameroon 3.6
Hong Kong 5.5 Central Africa –.5
India .4 Congo 3.6
Italy 3.4 Egypt 4.9
Malaysia 3.7 Ghana –.8
Mexico 2.4 Honduras 1.3
Nepal 1.0 Ivory Coast 1.5
Pakistan 2.3 Liberia .02
Peru .9 Mauritania .1
Philippines 1.4 Niger .3
Portugal 4.0 Nigeria –.2
South Africa 1.6 Rwanda 1.3
Singapore 5.4 Sierra Leone .6
Spain 3.4 Somalia –.1
Sri Lanka 1.2 Sudan –.1
Syria 4.2 Tanzania 2.3
Thailand 3.5 Uganda .6
Uruguay .1 Zaire –.2
United States 1.8 Zambia –1.6
Average 2.4 Average .9
SOURCE OF PRIMARY DATA: Summers and Heston (1991).
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company in the United States, it may seem unfair
to lose business to a Mexican company that is far
less efficient. Should efficiency not be rewarded?
Efficiency is rewarded, but in a different
way. The U.S. comparative advantage lies in areas
in which our productivity advantages outstrip the
disadvantages of having higher wages. Import-
competing industries in the United States cannot
meet the pace set by our most productive indus-
tries. In 1992, the United States had a trade
surplus of nearly a $5 billion with Mexico, even
though Mexico had higher tariffs than the United
States, and the United States had wages that were
about seven times higher than Mexican wages. In
industries that manufacture and market machine
tools, electrical machinery, and high-tech business
equipment, Mexican workers have difficulty com-
peting with highly skilled U.S. workers.
Low wages are not the key to exporting; if
they were, countries with low wages like Bangla-
desh and Haiti would be great exporting nations.
The truth is exactly the opposite: Germany and
the United States are the world’s largest exporting
countries.
American goods create American jobs. Critics
of free trade often claim that protection of domestic
industries saves jobs. This rationale proceeds at
two levels. First, the economically sophisticated
argument holds that the benefits of free trade are
derived from theoretical models that assume the
economy has full employment. Because there is
unemployment in the economy, free trade is not
necessarily optimal because unemployment might
actually increase.
It is true that theoretical arguments for free
trade assume full employment and are taken from
a simplified version of reality, but these assump-
tions work well in practice. In fact, absence of free
trade may be more correlated to unemployment
than the presence of free trade. The most impor-
tant event in the history of U.S. protection was
the 1930 Smoot–Hawley bill, which substantially
raised tariff rates. The Smoot–Hawley tariff inspired
a trade war between the United States and Europe
that may have prolonged and deepened the Great
Depression of the 1930s (Meltzer 1976, 460).3
Arguments for free trade, however, should
not be based on jobs claims. Free trade is not
about the number of jobs, but about the types of
jobs and standards of living. U.S. experience shows
that unemployment changes substantially over
the course of business cycles but, over time, the
number of jobs roughly equals the size of the
working-age population. What matters in the long
run is the type of future jobs that are available. If
the goal of U.S. policy were to keep jobs, today
we would have thriving horse-drawn carriage and
blacksmith industries. By keeping the same jobs we
have always had we discourage the development
of new high-skill jobs that add to the stock of
knowledge and generate innovation and growth.
A second argument simply holds that imports
of textiles, consumer electronics, and automobiles
cost domestic textile workers, electronics workers,
and auto workers their good jobs and force them to
take bad jobs. In other words, imports supposedly
displace domestic workers. The slogan, “American
goods create American jobs,” has become a rally-
ing cry, but often such sentiments are rooted in
the fallacy of composition. What is true for the
part is not necessarily true for the whole. It is
certainly true that imports of textiles or cars can
destroy American textile or automobile jobs. But
it is not true that imports reduce the number of
jobs in a country. A big increase in imports will
inevitably cause an increase in exports or foreign
investment. In other words, if Americans suddenly
wanted more Japanese cars, eventually American
exports would have to increase to pay for these
goods. The jobs lost in one industry are replaced
by jobs gained in another industry.
In a capitalist society, progress entails what
Joseph Schumpeter called “creative destruction.”
Fundamentally, new job opportunities destroy old
job opportunities. The rise of manufacturing in the
twentieth century destroyed jobs in farming. Jobs
in the automobile and airline industries destroyed
jobs in the railroad industry.4 Imports are just
another way of producing goods. As old jobs
3 President Hoover signed the Smoot–Hawley Act despite a
petition from a rare consensus of 1,028 economists strongly
warning of the dire consequences of higher tariffs.
4 See Cox and Alm (1993) for a discussion of the U.S.
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disappear and new ones emerge, people and jobs
are eventually matched, but periods of unemploy-
ment are inevitable as the economy continually
adjusts to new ways of production and new goods.
Economic theory suggests that, for the
economy as a whole, more exports lead to more
imports, and vice versa, so that neither imports
nor exports should correlate with widespread
unemployment. Jobs lost and jobs gained roughly
balance. Table 3 sheds some light on the correla-
tion between unemployment rates and import
penetration (the ratio of imports to gross domestic
product) or export performance (the ratio of
exports to gross domestic product). Data are from
the twenty-three members of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
for 1950–88.
The data suggest that there is no simple
causal link between unemployment and import
penetration or export performance. Correlations
of import penetration with the following year’s
unemployment rate vary substantially among
countries, from 0.814 in France to –0.809 in
Greece. There is no statistically significant correla-
tion for eight countries, and for nearly half the
countries for which there is a significant correla-
tion, the correlation is negative. Moreover, virtually
the same pattern of correlation holds for export
performance. There is no instance of a significant
positive or negative correlation of imports with
Table 3
The Correlation Between Future Unemployment Rates and
Current Import Penetration or Export Performance, 1950–88






















United Kingdom .340* .537*
United States .390* .350*
*Correlation significant at 5-percent level or above.
SOURCE OF PRIMARY DATA: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the
Centre for Economic Performance, 1950–88, Centre for Economic
Performance, the London School of Economics.Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 10
the following year’s unemployment that is not
similar for exports.5 Exports and imports are more
related to each other than other macroeconomic
factors, as one would expect since, ultimately,
exports must pay for imports. In this case, as in
others, practice follows theory.
A country can gain from strategic trade
policy. New theories of international trade that
emphasize monopolistic competition and interna-
tional oligopolies have led some economists to
think that free trade may be out of date (Krugman
1986). The new theories of trade have emphasized
the importance of economies of scale, learning
curves, and innovation. These new theories are
incompatible with the assumption of perfect com-
petition that lies behind the classical argument for
free trade. Thus, in a real world environment, some
have argued, a country might be able to follow
an activist trade policy that promotes domestic
industries at the expense of foreign competitors.
Strategic trade policy is usually based on
one of two key ideas. The first is that a domestic
industry is part of a world industry that earns
monopoly profits. Subsidizing a domestic firm can
secure more of the world’s monopoly profits for a
country. The second is that a particular industry,
such as semiconductors, may confer spillover
benefits on other domestic industries by lowering
their costs and raising their rates of return. In this
latter case, subsidizing the industry generating the
spillover benefits may improve a country’s total
real income.
Proposals for the use of trade protection to
benefit the domestic economy at the possible
expenses of other countries have a long history.
For many years, trade theorists have recognized
the possibility that through a tariff a large country
may be able to raise revenue by, in effect, getting
smaller foreign countries to pay indirectly into the
national treasury. This rationale has been called
the optimum tariff argument.
The difficulties with all such trade policy
arguments are threefold. First, such policies assume
that foreign governments will not retaliate. Foreign
retaliation can reverse any potential gain antici-
pated from domestic protection. Second, as
discussed in more detail later, most arguments for
protection assume that tariffs and subsidies are
imposed by a benevolent dictator, rather than
political parties representing special interest
groups. Most trade policy decisions, however, are
not determined by what is in the best interests of
the whole country; usually they are the result of
political lobbying. Finally, strategic trade policy
conclusions are based on theoretical models, but
the implementation of the policy relies heavily
on empirical estimates of industry demand and
supply that can vary substantially over time. Given
these problems, it is unlikely that any government
could, even if it had the power to do so, imple-
ment the optimal policy (Grossman 1986).
The problems of industrial policy
Since the 1980s, it has become increasingly
popular to advocate industrial policy as a means
of promoting specific domestic industries and a
way to gain access to foreign markets. A common
belief is that the United States is becoming
deindustrialized as other nations grow at our
expense. Many fear that deindustrialization is the
result of supportive industrial policies of foreign
governments and lackadaisical U.S. policy. How-
ever, no country, not even Japan, has clearly
gained from industrial policy.
Many developed countries, including the
United States, have experienced a growing com-
parative advantage in high-technology industries
that caused a natural movement away from the
labor- and capital-intensive products that utilize
standardized technologies. Although this transi-
tion has led to a decline in manufacturing employ-
ment in the United States and other developed
countries, it has not meant the deindustrialization
of the United States per se. Among the OECD
countries, the U.S. share of manufacturing output
has increased slightly since the early 1970s. In
1990, the U.S. share of OECD manufacturing
production was 37 percent, slightly higher than
the U.S. share of total OECD population.6 The
relatively steady size of U.S. manufacturing pro-
5 This relationship also holds for the contemporaneous corre-
lation with unemployment and import penetration or export
performance.
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duction has been accompanied by expanded U.S.
trade. Increased trade has not come at the expense
of manufacturing.
Much has been made of the fact that from
1973 to 1992 U.S. hourly wages in manufacturing
dropped from $12.90 to $11.50 (both in 1992
dollars), while during the same period, imports as
a percent of GDP increased from less than 12 per-
cent to about 21 percent. Has trade led to a drop
in manufacturing wages? Looking only at hourly
wages can be misleading. Hourly wages do not
measure total hourly compensation. Since 1973,
employee benefits (including medical and pension
benefits) have increased substantially. Generally, a
dollar paid in wages is equivalent to a dollar paid
in employee benefits. Figure 2 plots real hourly
compensation for manufacturing workers against
trade as a share of gross domestic product (GDP)
over the past twenty years. Hourly compensation
includes wages, benefits, as well as employer
contributions toward Social Security. As the figure
shows, real manufacturing compensation has
continued to rise along with trade throughout the
1970s and 1980s. Although the real hourly compen-
sation of workers in some industries undoubtedly
has fallen, overall it has not declined.
While U.S. manufacturing production has
not fallen, is there any evidence to suggest that
industrial policy and targeted protection has
worked for other nations? We often hear the argu-
ment that Japan has done rather well during the
postwar era in protecting and promoting certain
industries. In particular, the Japanese Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (MITI) has often
been credited with consistently providing support
to industries that could not have been competitive
in world markets had they not been supported.
Moreover, the phenomenal success and strength
of the Japanese economy is often attributed to
MITI’s farsighted approach to industry support.
Has Japan been successful in promoting and
protecting its industries? Japanese real per capita
GDP growth has averaged a robust 6.1 percent a
year since 1950. During the same period, U.S. real
per capita growth averaged only 2.1 percent a
year. But most of Japan’s growth would probably
have occurred without MITI’s policies. First, over
the past four decades, Japanese savings as a per-
centage of GDP was three to four times greater
than that of the United States. This high level of
savings generated a cheap and plentiful pool of
funds for most of the growth differential between
Japan and the United States (Barro 1991). In addi-
tion, Japan has also had the unique advantage of
being able to catch up to the level of technology
of the United States. With its large pool of savings,
Japan has been able to invest in the latest tech-
nology without devoting the time required to
develop the new technology. The United States,
however, already possessing the newest technology
during the postwar period, grew at the slower
pace as the frontiers of technology were being
pushed forward.
Evidence now suggests that productivity
growth in Japan and the other major industrialized
nations is beginning to slow and converge with
that of the United States. While U.S. real per capita
income grew at a relative steady pace of 2.1 per-
cent per year from 1950 to 1989, Japanese per
capita income grew at a rapid 8.3 percent from
1950 to 1970, but slowed to 3.4 percent from 1970
to 1989. The same sort of convergence has occurred
in other developed nations during the postwar
era. However, despite relatively high growth rates
among developed countries, the U.S. per capita
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Other developed nations are catching up to
the United States’ level of technological develop-
ment. Their gains reflect the international diffu-
sion of technology and accumulation of capital
after World War II. Future U.S. leadership in
technology, however, cannot benefit from U.S.
protection. Technological growth will ultimately
be determined by the skill level of U.S. workers.
Recent economic evidence suggests that education
and open markets are key elements to strength in
technological innovation and growth.7
Although the Japanese government has
promoted saving and investment though tax laws
and other measures, the benefits of MITI’s industrial
policies are questionable. MITI did successfully
funnel resources into the steel and semiconductor
industries and promoted internationally competi-
tive industries, but it is unlikely that the benefits
of such a policy were greater than the costs. As
Paul Krugman (1987) has pointed out, the relevant
question is whether this particular use of Japanese
resources generated a higher return for the nation
than would have been earned had the private
market allocated the funds. Although economists
have long recognized the theoretical possibility of
certain industries’ generating national rates of
return higher than private rates of return, in practice
few industries actually fit this criterion. Moreover,
even if some industries did fit the criterion,
governments are ill-equipped to identify them.
Some of Japan’s biggest success stories (TVs,
stereos, and VCRs) were not the industries most
heavily targeted by MITI. Moreover, as these
products have become even more standardized,
production has moved out of Japan to Korea and
other Southeast Asian countries. The inability of
governments to pick the winners is evidenced by
MITI’s actual or likely failures:
• MITI first wanted the Japanese automobile
industry to produce only trucks and later
wanted to limit the number of automobile
companies to a few giants, in particular,
attempting to keep Honda out of the car
business. Of course, market forces eventu-
ally led MITI to abandon these plans, but
the intervention generated costs that could
have been avoided. Had MITI been suc-
cessful, Japan would have paid an enor-
mous price for this policy.
• The Japanese heavily targeted an analog
version of high definition television (HDTV),
but it appears that digital HDTV—the
product of U.S. research and development
—will be the industry standard.
• MITI is now investing in cold fusion, a
procedure for creating nuclear power that
has been debunked by most of the scien-
tific establishment.
These examples and many others indicate
that even Japan has done a poor job of picking
the winning industries.
Similarly, the U.S. government’s commercial-
ization programs have produced only one clear
success—the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration’s program for launching communi-
cations satellites from 1963 to 1973 (Cohen and
Noll 1991). Government efforts to promote nuclear
power and synthetic fuels have wasted billions
(Cohen and Noll 1991).
Even if it were possible to recognize future
winning industries with high rates of return, is it
7 See Gould and Ruffin (1993) and Roubini and Sala-i-Martin
(1991).
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possible to subsidize them successfully? While most
economists recognize the possibility of industries
with technological spillovers and social benefits
higher than private rates of return, they also realize
that the political market that generates policies
does not always allocate funds in a way that maxi-
mizes their economic efficiency. Governments
rarely implement policies that maximize the country’s
well-being. Rather, governments maximize their
political support and, in doing so, implement
policies that benefit the most powerful and vocal
interest groups. Indeed, there is much evidence to
suggest that trade policy is primarily determined
by special interest groups.
The politics of protection
If free trade maximizes a country’s income
and allows its citizens to achieve greater average
welfare, why do we continually observe govern-
ments implementing policies that inhibit flows of
goods and services between nations? Although
government intervention is not necessarily incon-
sistent with the objective of maximizing national
income (for instance, in the optimal tariff case),
we rarely observe trade policies implemented to
meet this objective. Trade policy usually reflects
the lobbying efforts of special interest groups.
Economists increasingly are recognizing that
trade policies are usually not designed to improve
economic performance but, rather, aim to alter the
distribution of income.8 This consensus is based
on the observation that trade policy is an endoge-
nous outcome of the political process. In a demo-
cratic system in which politicians must achieve or
maintain political office, special interest lobbying
groups exert strong influence. Lobbying, either by
informing the government of the support for a
policy or by directly funding the election of a
particular party, can influence electoral success
and, hence, trade policies. Mindful of this, special
interest groups, whose economic welfare can
depend on the outcome of a particular trade
policy, have an incentive to lobby for legislative
outcome in their own favor.
Because almost every change in policy pro-
duces winners and losers, the political contest is
competitive. Pro-protection forces are predomi-
nantly industry-based coalitions of capital owners
and labor organized through industry associations
and labor unions. The losers from import protec-
tion are consumers who face higher prices and
the owners of factors of production employed in
exporting industries that face the possibility of
reduced access to foreign markets through retalia-
tion.9 Trade policy is the outcome of the political
contest between these opposing forces, which is
primarily determined by the lobbying expendi-
tures of the two groups.
The gainers from trade policy tend to be
highly concentrated in well-defined industry
interest groups, while the losers tend to be far a
more diffuse group of consumers. Consequently,
while the total cost of a particular trade policy
often exceeds the gains, the costs are widely
dispersed over a large group of consumers who
individually have little incentive to lobby against
the policy. For example, in 1984 the U.S. Federal
Trade Commission estimated that import quotas
and tariffs on sugar benefited U.S. sugar produc-
ers by $783 million, while costing U.S. consumers
$1.266 billion.10 While the losses far exceeded the
gains, the loss of $5 per average consumer was
hardly enough to motivate these individuals to
actively resist the policy. The political contest is
biased in favor of the pro-protection coalitions
because the benefits of trade policy are concen-
trated, while the costs are diffuse.
Because trade policy is typically used to alter
the distribution of income rather than to increase
national income, resources devoted to lobbying
are wasted. Moreover, as discussed by Magee,
Brock, and Young (1989) and Olson (1982), the
value of resources expended on these unproduc-
tive activities can approach the size of the transfer
itself. The reason is that lobbyists have an eco-
nomic incentive to expend resources as long as
potential benefits exceed their lobbying costs.
8 See Hillman (1989) and Quibria (1989) for surveys of this
literature.
9 See Gould and Woodbridge (1993) for a discussion of the
incentives of exporting industries to oppose import protec-
tion if there is a possibility that the policy will induce
retaliation by a trading partner.
10 See Tarr and Morkre (1984).Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 14
Thus, lobbying costs can mushroom to the level
of potential benefits. Olson (1982) argues that
these costs have limited the economic growth of
nations. These findings are of concern to those
mindful of the economic costs of trade policy. The
resource costs in contesting trade policies may, in
fact, dwarf the costs of the protection itself.11
Conclusion
It is difficult to overestimate the advantages
a country derives from international trade. Every
person can enjoy the technological and geo-
graphical advantages that exist any other place in
the world. A villager in India may listen to local
broadcasts on a Sony radio running on batteries
produced in Korea. Americans and Europeans
enjoy their tea times and coffee breaks, using
Indian tea or South American coffee. A world
without international commerce would not be a
pleasant one.
The case for free trade can be made not only
in terms of basic economic principles, but also in
terms of the experience of countries that have
followed protectionist policies. Arguments for pro-
tection are contradicted by the evidence. High-
wage countries not only compete with low-wage
countries, they in fact dominate world trade. Trade
deficits or surpluses simply reflect consumption
and investment decisions over time: they are not
inherently bad or good. Moreover, there is no
evidence that imports cause systematic unemploy-
ment or that exports create systematic employment.
Both arguments are based on the fundamental
fallacy of composition that what is good or bad
for one is good or bad for all. Highly protected
economies tend to grow slower than open econo-
mies, and industrial policies designed to promote
particular industries usually backfire. Protectionist
policies feed interest groups rather than fuel
economic growth.
11 See Hillman (1989) for a review of the literature on the costs
of rent-seeking.Economic Review — Fourth Quarter 1993 15
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